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 NOTE 
To Instruct, or Not To Instruct, That Is the 
Question 
State v. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
JARED GUEMMER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A criminal trial is an arduous process.  By the end of this process, the 
fact-finder – often a jury – makes a determination regarding the defendant’s 
culpability for the crimes with which she is charged.  Sometimes, the State’s 
evidence is insufficient to prove guilt of the charged offense beyond a reason-
able doubt.  In such cases, the jury may also consider the defendant’s guilt as 
to a lesser charge that is included within the charged offense.  The jury’s job 
is to ensure justice is done, and the defendant is convicted on the correct 
charge or acquitted entirely. 
However, judges do not always provide juries with the opportunity to 
consider all possible options.  Sometimes, judges deny juries the ability to 
consider a lesser included offense.  They do this by refusing to instruct the 
jury that it may consider the lesser offense, and what must be proven in order 
to determine guilt for that offense.  As a result, guilt becomes an all-or-
nothing proposition.  Some guilty defendants may escape punishment entire-
ly, while those guilty of a lesser crime may be punished more severely than 
their actions deserve. 
In State v. Jackson, the Supreme Court of Missouri considered whether 
a trial court must instruct the jury regarding a lesser included offense.1  Spe-
cifically, it confronted this question in the context of a “nested” lesser includ-
ed offense: an offense whose elements are entirely subsumed by the greater 
offense, and the greater offense has some “differential element” that the State 
bears the burden to prove.2  The court ultimately concluded that a jury in-
struction on such a lesser included offense, when requested by the defendant, 
must always be granted.3  A judge’s refusal to grant the requested instruction 
jeopardizes the defendant’s right to a trial by jury.4  Thus, the court ensured 
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 1. State v. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 402. 
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that juries would have the opportunity to consider a lesser degree of liability 
for the defendant’s actions. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
A jury found that Denford Jackson walked into a coffee 
shop/convenience store the morning of August 29, 2009, and robbed the 
store’s cash register while holding a gun on an employee.5  Jackson was con-
victed of robbery in the first degree and armed criminal action.6 
Only three people were in the store at the time of the robbery, two cus-
tomers and the employee.7  The customers testified that Jackson entered the 
coffee shop side of the store and spoke with one of them for a short time.8  
Neither customer saw a gun in Jackson’s possession, but Jackson kept one of 
his hands in his pocket during the entire conversation.9  After the conversa-
tion ended, Jackson went to the other side of the store, where the cash register 
was located.10  When the customers next saw Jackson, he was standing at the 
cash register, behind the store’s employee.11  Neither customer saw whether 
Jackson had a gun, and neither knew a robbery occurred until the employee 
ran out of the kitchen to say she had been robbed.12 
The employee testified she was in the kitchen when Jackson entered the 
door behind the cash register.13  As she approached him, Jackson grabbed her 
arm and turned her toward the door and the cash register.14  She said she “felt 
something in [her] back,” and that she “[l]ooked down and it was a gun.”15  
She testified that she “could see it after [she] had looked down and he guided 
 
 5. Id. at 392. 
 6. Id. at 394–95.  Robbery in the first degree requires the jury find that Jackson, 
in the course of taking the property, “displayed or threatened the use of what appeared 
to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.”  Id. at 394; see MO. REV. STAT. § 
569.020.3 (2000).  Thus, robbery in the first degree merely requires a jury to conclude 
that the employee reasonably believed Jackson was armed with a gun.  See id.  Armed 
criminal action requires that the jury find that Jackson committed the robbery “by, 
with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous instrument or deadly weap-
on.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 571.015.1 (2000).  This means that the jury found, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Jackson did, in fact, use a gun when he robbed the convenience 
store, rather than only finding that the employee was reasonable in her belief that the 
object in Jackson’s hand appeared to be a gun.  Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 394 n.2. 
 7. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 392. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 392–93. 
 13. Id. at 393. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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[her] forward,”16 and she noted that it had a “six-inch barrel,” was “silverish,” 
and “was a revolver.”17  After he took the money from the register, Jackson 
took the employee back to the kitchen, made her lie down, and checked her 
pockets for more money.18  He then left through a door on the shop’s conven-
ience store side.19 
The State introduced video surveillance tapes from the shop into evi-
dence, which showed Jackson entering the shop and standing near the cus-
tomers while always keeping one hand in his pocket.20  The video shows 
Jackson taking something out of his pocket and examining it after walking 
away from the customers.21  He then entered the kitchen area where the em-
ployee was working.22  The video shows the two of them coming out of the 
kitchen, with Jackson behind the employee, holding something to her back.23  
As they exit from behind the register, the employee turns and the object in 
Jackson’s hand is briefly visible.24  Jackson then grabs the employee and 
leads her back to the kitchen.25 
A detective testified for the State regarding the videos.26  He testified 
that Jackson could be seen holding a small dark blue or black pistol to the 
employee’s back, and that Jackson’s movements prior to entering the kitchen 
were the movements one would see from someone checking to make sure a 
revolver is loaded.27  On cross-examination, the detective agreed that a blurry 
video might show an object that looked like a gun, when it might actually be 
something like a cell phone.28  The detective refused to say this object could 
be a cell phone because “people do not check to see if their cell phone is 
loaded right before committing a crime.”29 
After the close of evidence, Jackson’s attorney requested a jury instruc-
tion for the lesser included offense of second-degree robbery.30  Jackson’s 
attorney argued that the jury could look at the video and determine that a gun 
was not used, and that the employee was not reasonable in her belief that 
Jackson had a gun.31  The trial judge refused to grant the instruction, stating, 
“[I]f I were to submit it here then I’d have to submit it every time there’s a 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 393–94. 
 28. Id. at 394. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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robbery first brought, and I don’t think that’s the law.”32  Jackson was con-
victed of first-degree robbery33 and armed criminal action.34  Jackson ap-
pealed.35 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District affirmed Jack-
son’s conviction, finding no error in the trial court’s refusal to grant the jury 
instruction for the lesser included offense.36  The court declined to provide a 
written opinion because there would be no jurisprudential value in doing so.37 
On transfer to the Supreme Court of Missouri, Jackson argued there was 
a sufficient basis in the evidence to support an acquittal for first-degree rob-
bery, and that he was, therefore, entitled to a jury instruction on second-
degree robbery.38  Jackson argued that the surveillance video in the shop, 
combined with the discrepancy between the detective’s and employee’s tes-
timony regarding the gun’s appearance, established a basis in the evidence to 
acquit him of first-degree robbery.39 
The State said this evidence only disputed whether Jackson actually 
used a gun, not whether the employee’s belief that Jackson had a gun was 
reasonable.40  Additionally, the State argued that the jury’s right to disbelieve 
evidence submitted by the State did not, by itself, establish a sufficient basis 
in the evidence to acquit Jackson of the charged offense.41  There must be a 
sufficient basis in the evidence in order to trigger the statute governing when 
a trial court is required to grant a jury instruction for a lesser included of-
fense.42 
In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial 
court’s refusal to grant Jackson’s request to instruct the jury on the lesser 
included offense of second-degree robbery.43  The court vacated his convic-
tion and remanded for a new trial.44  It held that a trial court may not refuse to 
grant a jury instruction for a lesser included offense requested by a defendant 
under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 556.046 when the elements of the 
lesser included offense are entirely subsumed by the charged offense, and the 
differential element is one on which the State bears the burden of proof.45 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 394 n.2. 
 35. Id. at 395. 
 36. State v. Jackson, 2012 WL 6131696, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 397; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 556.046 (2000). 
 39. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 397. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.; see also § 556.046. 
 42. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 397; see also § 556.046. 
 43. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 409–10. 
 44. Id. at 392. 
 45. Id. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part will discuss three primary aspects of the law related to the 
holding in Jackson.  First, it will provide an explanation of the statutory lan-
guage analyzed by the Jackson court.  Second, it will explore the case law 
that establishes a direct precedential lineage for lesser included offense in-
structions.  Finally, it will note the methods by which a defendant is granted 
the right to a trial by jury. 
A.  The Statutory Law 
Lesser included offenses are governed by Section 556.046.46  Under 
Section 556.046, there are three circumstances when an offense may be a 
lesser included offense, but the only circumstance relevant to this case is 
when the offense “is established by proof of the same or less than all of the 
facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.”47  In es-
sence, “An offense is a lesser included offense if it is impossible to commit 
the greater without necessarily committing the lesser.”48 
For example, a defendant commits first-degree robbery when he “forci-
bly steals property and in the course thereof he . . . displays or threatens the 
use of what appears to be a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.”49  A 
defendant commits second-degree robbery “when he forcibly steals proper-
ty.”50  The differential element between these two crimes is the use of “what 
appears to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument” during the commis-
sion of the crime.51  A person is incapable of committing first-degree robbery 
without also committing second-degree robbery.  A defendant commits sec-
ond-degree robbery when she forcibly steals property, and she commits first-
degree robbery when she forcibly steals property while displaying or threat-
 
 46. See § 556.046. 
 47. Id. § 556.046.1(1).  Another circumstance is when the offense “is specifically 
denominated by statute as a lesser degree of the offense charged.”  Id. § 556.046.1(2).  
Also, when the offense “consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to 
commit an offense otherwise included therein.”  Id. § 556.046.1(3). 
 48. State v. Derenzy, 89 S.W.3d 472, 474 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (citing State v. 
Barnard, 972 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)).   In his majority opinion in 
Jackson, Judge Wilson refers to this as a “nested” lesser included offense.  Jackson, 
433 S.W.3d at 392. 
 49. MO. REV. STAT. § 569.020.3 (2000).  Those aspects of the statute not relevant 
to the facts of this case have been omitted. 
 50. Id. § 569.030.  The differential element between first-degree robbery and 
second-degree robbery is whether the defendant “displayed or threatened the use of 
what appeared to be a deadly or dangerous instrument.”  Id. § 569.020.  Thus, if the 
jury concluded that Jackson forcibly stole property, but also concluded the employ-
ee’s belief that Jackson had a gun was unreasonable, it could acquit him of first-
degree robbery and convict him of second-degree robbery.  See id. 
 51. Id. § 569.020, .030. 
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ening the use of what appears to be a dangerous instrument.52  Therefore, 
second-degree robbery is a lesser included offense of first-degree robbery. 
Under Section 556.046.2, a trial court is not required to instruct the jury 
regarding a lesser included offense “unless there is a basis for a verdict ac-
quitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the in-
cluded offense.”53  However, Section 556.046.3, added to Section 556.046 in 
2001,54 states that a trial court shall instruct the jury for an included offense 
“only if there is a basis in the evidence for acquitting the defendant of the 
immediately higher offense and there is a basis in the evidence for convicting 
the defendant of that particular included offense.”55  Whether these state-
ments are interchangeable is one aspect of the disagreement between the ma-
jority and dissent in Jackson.56 
B.  The Primary Precedent 
Four cases have most influenced Missouri’s jurisprudence regarding ju-
ry instructions for lesser included offenses. 
In State v. Olson, decided in 1982, the defendant was convicted of rape, 
sodomy, and assault in the first degree by use of a dangerous instrument.57  
The defendant asserted the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on 
second- and third-degree assault.58  The defendant testified in his own de-
fense, claiming the victim never entered his vehicle and that he did not attack 
her.59 
The court in Olson rejected the defendant’s argument, and held that Sec-
tion 556.046.2 requires a trial court to instruct the jury on a lesser included 
offense only “where there is some affirmative evidence of a lack of an essen-
tial element of the higher offense which would not only authorize acquittal of 
the higher but sustain a conviction of the lesser.”60  In essence, the Olson 
court required a defendant to produce evidence that, if true, would negate an 
element of the greater offense. 
In 1997, State v. Santillan overruled Olson to the extent it required a de-
fendant to present affirmative evidence of the lack of an essential element of 
a higher offense.61  There, Santillan was charged and convicted of first-degree 
murder, and he asserted the trial court erred in refusing to grant him an in-
 
 52. Id. §§ 569.020.3–.030. 
 53. MO. REV. STAT. § 556.046.2 (2000). 
 54. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 396. 
 55. § 556.046.3. 
 56. See Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 396, 415. 
 57. 636 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), overruled by Jackson, 433 
S.W.3d 390. 
 58. Id. at 320. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 321–22. 
 61. 948 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). 
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struction for second-degree murder.62  The differential element between the 
two offenses was whether the defendant deliberated before he caused the 
death of another.63 
The State presented evidence that it claimed demonstrated delibera-
tion.64  The defendant and the deceased were friends who were interested in 
the same woman.65  Additionally, the deceased suffered two wounds, no at-
tempt was made to get medical attention for the deceased, and the defendant 
tried to bury the deceased’s body.66 
The court in Santillan ultimately held that an instruction for the lesser 
included offense was appropriate because “a reasonable juror could draw 
inferences from the evidence presented that the defendant did not deliber-
ate.”67  Further, the court held that “[t]o the extent that Olson . . . may be read 
to require a defendant to put on affirmative evidence as to the lack of an es-
sential element of the higher offense, [it is] overruled.”68 
Seven years later, in 2004, the court addressed the issue again in State v. 
Pond.69  The defendant was convicted of first-degree statutory sodomy, and 
he argued that he was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included of-
fense of first-degree child molestation.70  The differential element between 
the offenses is “penetration . . . of the male or female sex organ.”71 
The victim initially testified that the defendant “put his fingers ‘in [her] 
body.’”72  On cross-examination, the victim said she never mentioned that the 
defendant penetrated her, that she originally told her mother that the defend-
ant only “touched” her, and that, during the preliminary hearing, she said the 
defendant “pushed on her private area.”73  The State argued the defendant 
was not entitled to a jury instruction for a lesser included offense because he 
did not present any affirmative evidence.74  Additionally, it argued that the 
mere fact that a jury “might disbelieve some of the State’s evidence” does not 
entitle the defendant to an instruction for a lesser included offense.75 
The court rejected the State’s first argument, basing its rejection on the 
prior ruling in Santillan.76  The court rejected the State’s second argument, 
stating, “A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any theory the evidence 
 
 62. Id. at 574–75. 
 63. Id. at 576. 
 64. Id. at 575. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 576. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 131 S.W.3d 792 (Mo. 2004) (en banc). 
 70. Id. at 793. 
 71. Id. at 793–94 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 566.010.1 (2000)). 
 72. Id. at 794. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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establishes,” and “A jury may accept part of a witness’s testimony, but disbe-
lieve other parts.”77  The court noted that it “leaves to the jury” the job of 
“determining the credibility of witnesses, resolving conflicts in testimony, 
and weighing evidence.”78  It said that “Section 556.046.2 requires only a 
basis for the jury to acquit on the higher offense,” and “If the evidence sup-
ports differing conclusions, the judge must instruct on each.”79  The court 
ultimately determined that “‘[t]he jury could have believed part of the vic-
tim’s testimony, that defendant touched her, and disbelieved that defendant 
penetrated her.’  A reasonable jury could find the prior statements more be-
lievable than those at trial.”80  Therefore, the defendant was entitled to an 
instruction on the lesser included offense.81 
Finally, in 2010, the court decided State v. Williams, where the defend-
ant was convicted of second-degree robbery through accomplice liability.82  
The defendant was denied his request for an instruction for the lesser includ-
ed offense of felony stealing.83  The differential element between the two 
offenses is the element of force.84 
The defendant testified that his friend, “Sweets,” took marijuana from 
the victim during a drug transaction at the victim’s apartment.85  However, he 
also testified that he did not enter the apartment, and that he did not see 
Sweets use force in taking marijuana or money from the victim.86 
The State argued there was no basis in the evidence for acquitting the 
defendant of second-degree robbery and instead convicting him of felony 
stealing because, while the defendant is not required to put forth his own af-
firmative evidence, there must nonetheless be some evidence in the record 
that would support a lesser included instruction.87  The State argued that the 
defendant “was not entitled to the instruction on the sole basis that the jury 
might disbelieve some of the state’s evidence,”88 and its ability to disbelieve 
evidence or refuse to draw necessary inferences “does not entitle the defend-
ant to an instruction otherwise unsupported by the evidence.”89  The court 
rejected this argument, noting that it rejected the same argument in Pond, and 
stated, “A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any theory the evidence 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 80. Id. (quoting State v. Robinson, 26 S.W.3d 414, 418 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)). 
 81. Id. at 795. 
 82. 313 S.W.3d 656, 657 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  Second-degree robbery requires the State prove that the defendant forci-
bly stole property, while felony stealing does not.  Id. at 657–58. 
 85. Id. at 657. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 660–61. 
 88. Id. at 661. 
 89. Id. at 660. 
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establishes.”90  The court briefly noted, “If a reasonable juror could draw 
inferences from the evidence presented that an essential element of the great-
er offense has not been established, the trial court should instruct down.”91 
The court held there was a basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of 
second-degree robbery, because “[t]he jurors could have believed [the de-
fendant] was complicit in the taking of money from [the victim], believed 
[the victim’s] testimony that no gun or knife was used, and disbelieved [the 
victim’s] testimony about the use of physical force.”92  The court made no 
mention of the jury choosing to believe the testimony of the defendant.93 
C.  The Right to a Trial by Jury 
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects a defendant’s 
right to be tried by an impartial jury.94  The Missouri Constitution provides, 
“[T]he right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate . . . 
.”95  Insofar as these rights to trial by jury are concerned, the Supreme Court 
of the United States has held that the U.S. Constitution prohibits judges from 
directing a verdict of guilt in a criminal proceeding.96  Additionally, the Su-
preme Court has held that due process demands that a criminal defendant 
must be found guilty of all facts constituting the offense charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt.97 
In 1895, in Sparf v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that a trial court did not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights when it told a jury that it could convict a defendant of murder or acquit 
him entirely, but it could not convict him of manslaughter because there was 
absolutely no evidence to support a conviction for manslaughter.98  However, 
so long as there is an adequate and independent foundation in state substan-
tive law, “[A] state decision resting on . . . state substantive law is immune 
from review in the federal courts.”99  Therefore, so long as Missouri’s sub-
stantive law provides an adequate and independent foundation upon which a 
decision deviating from Sparf may rest, Missouri is not required to restrict its 
interpretation of the right to a trial by jury to the interpretation handed down 
in Sparf. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a trial court is prohibited by 
the Missouri Constitution from directing a verdict of guilt, that the presump-
 
 90. Id. (quoting State v. Pond, 131 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)). 
 91. Id. (quoting State v. Derenzy, 89 S.W.3d 472, 474 (Mo. 2002) (en banc)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See generally Williams, 313 S.W.3d 656. 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 95. MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a). 
 96. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 84 (1983). 
 97. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). 
 98. 156 U.S. 51, 64, 103 (1895). 
 99. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977). 
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tion of the defendant’s innocence rests with him throughout the criminal pro-
ceeding, and the fact that a prima facie case for the defendant’s guilt has been 
made does not shift that presumption.100  Therefore, the Missouri Constitution 
provides an adequate and independent foundation that allows Missouri to 
create its own right to a trial by jury, and to determine what protections that 
right grants. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
State v. Jackson provided the Supreme Court of Missouri the opportuni-
ty to address, once again, the issue of when a trial court is required to instruct 
a jury on a lesser included offense.101  The Supreme Court of Missouri’s 
opinion, authored by Judge Paul C. Wilson, and joined by then-Chief Justice 
Russell and Judges Fischer and Teitelman, focused on only one issue: 
[W]hether the trial court can refuse to give a lesser included instruc-
tion requested by the defendant under Section 556.046 when the lesser 
offense consists of a subset of the elements of the charged offense and 
the differential element (i.e., the element required for the charged of-
fense but not for the lesser offense) is one on which the state bears the 
burden of proof.102 
In its 4-3 decision, the court held that the right of the jury to disbelieve 
any or all evidence and its right to refuse to draw necessary inferences to 
support a conviction was sufficient to give rise to a jury instruction for a less-
er included offense.103 
Judge Laura Denvir Stith authored an opinion concurring in part, and 
dissenting in part, which was joined by Judge Breckenridge.104  Judge George 
W. Draper III authored a separate dissent, which will not be analyzed in this 
Note because much of its reasoning is also articulated in Judge Stith’s opin-
ion.105  Judge Draper disagreed with Judge Stith’s conclusions regarding the 
facts of the case, but not in her analysis of the principal opinion.106 
A.  The Majority 
The court’s analysis began by considering the elements at issue when 
determining whether a trial court is required to give an instruction on a “first-
 
 100. State v. Shelby, 64 S.W.2d 269, 275 (Mo. 1933) (en banc). 
 101. 433 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 399, 409–10. 
 104. Id. at 409–10. 
 105. Id. at 422 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. 
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level” lesser included offense under Section 556.046.107  The court stated that 
the addition of 556.046.3 did not change its analysis, and that Sections 
556.046.2 and 556.046.3 are interchangeable when considering first-level 
lesser included offenses.108  The elements to be considered are: (1) “a party 
timely requests the instruction;”109 (2) “there is a basis in the evidence for 
acquitting the defendant of the charged offense; and”110 (3) “there is a basis in 
the evidence for convicting the defendant of the lesser included offense for 
which the instruction is requested.”111  The court concluded that the only 
question in this case was whether the second element was met because when 
dealing with a nested lesser included offense, there will always be a basis in 
the evidence for convicting the defendant of the lesser included offense.112 
The court then addressed, and dismissed, the arguments of both 
briefs.113  The court agreed with the State’s assertion that Jackson’s argument 
failed to address whether the employee was reasonable in her belief that Jack-
son had a gun, but that this was “immaterial,” because the proper question 
was whether the jury’s right to disbelieve evidence submitted by the State 
could, on its own, establish a basis in the evidence to acquit Jackson of the 
greater offense under Section 556.046.114 
The court’s analysis then focused on the direct precedent governing jury 
instructions for lesser included offenses under Section 556.046.115  The court 
noted the State’s continued reliance on Olson, even though that case was re-
peatedly rejected.116  First, the State relied on Olson in Santillan, where the 
Supreme Court of Missouri overruled Olson’s requirement that a defendant 
assert affirmative evidence demonstrating the lack of an essential element.117  
Then, Olson was rejected again in Pond, which also rejected the State’s ar-
gument that the jury’s ability to disbelieve evidence was not sufficient to 
entitle a defendant to an instruction for a lesser included offense by stating, 
 
 107. Id. at 396 (majority opinion).  The court was silent on what it meant when it 
referred to a “first-level” lesser included offense.  See id.  However, it likely refers to 
the first lesser included offense in a series of lesser included offenses.  See id.  For 
example, a first-level lesser included offense of first-degree assault would be second-
degree assault, while third-degree assault would be a second-level lesser included 
offense.  See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.050, .060, .070 (2000). 
 108. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 396.  The court did not discuss how these statutes 
might affect the requirement to grant a requested jury instruction for a lesser included 
offense that is not a first-level lesser included offense.  See id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 396, 404.  This is because it is impossible to commit the greater offense 
without also committing the lesser included offense.  Id. at 404. 
 113. Id. at 397; see supra Part II (discussing the arguments briefed by the parties). 
 114. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 397. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 397–98. 
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“A jury may accept part of a witness’s testimony, but disbelieve other 
parts.”118 
The majority then turned to Williams, where it emphasized the court’s 
express rejection of the State’s argument that the defendant “was not entitled 
to the instruction on the sole basis that the jury might disbelieve some of the 
State’s evidence.”119  The court determined that Williams clearly rejected any 
continued reliance on Olson’s suggestion that some affirmative evidence 
must be presented to the trial court in order to require the court to instruct the 
jury on a lesser included offense, but that it also failed to expressly overrule 
Olson.120  Therefore, the court announced that it would now overrule the sur-
viving language of Olson that continued to suggest that some affirmative 
evidence was required in order to establish a basis in the evidence to support 
a jury instruction for a lesser included offense.121 
The court stated that it would now expressly hold what Pond and Wil-
liams implied: the jury’s right to disbelieve the evidence and its right to re-
fuse to draw necessary inferences, standing alone, is a sufficient basis in the 
evidence to acquit the defendant of the charged offense, and that Olson is 
overruled to the extent that it suggests otherwise.122 
The court then shifted its analysis to the context in which the decision to 
grant, or refuse to grant, a jury instruction for a lesser included offense is 
made.123  The court noted that decisions of what evidence the jury must be-
lieve, and what inferences the jury is required to draw, is left to the jury, and 
judges are not to decide what reasonable jurors must do.124  Evidence never 
proves an element of a crime until every juror says it does, and no inference 
is drawn until every juror draws it.125  It is in this context that the language of 
Section 556.046 must be interpreted.126 
The court stated that it is the “universally accepted law of this state that 
a court in the trial of a criminal prosecution cannot direct the jury to return a 
verdict of guilty[.]”127  It then quoted State v. Shelby for the proposition that 
“no court in Missouri has the power or right to direct a verdict of guilty in the 
face of our constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, our statute forbidding the 
judge to sum up or comment on the evidence.”128  Further, “The presumption 
 
 118. Id. at 398 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Pond, 131 S.W.3d 792, 794 
(Mo. 2004) (en banc)). 
 119. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Mo. 
2010) (en banc)). 
 120. Id. at 399. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 399, 401–02. 
 123. Id. at 399. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 400. 
 126. Id. at 399, 400, 402. 
 127. Id. at 401 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. McNamera, 110 S.W. 
1067, 1071–72 (Mo. 1908)). 
 128. Id. (quoting State v. Shelby, 64 S.W.2d 269, 275 (Mo. 1933) (en banc)). 
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of innocence with which defendant is clothed, and never which shifts, rests 
with him throughout . . . .”129  With these statements, the court indicated that 
the Missouri Constitution’s grant of the right to trial by jury would govern, 
rather than the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
The court reasoned that when a court decides whether to instruct the ju-
ry on a lesser included offense in a criminal case under Section 556.046, 
based on a determination of what a reasonable juror must or must not find or 
infer, treads dangerously close to directing a verdict of guilt in a criminal 
case.130  To refuse to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense because the 
evidence is so compelling as to make it unreasonable for a juror to acquit the 
defendant as to the differential element creates the same effect as a directed 
verdict of guilt as to the differential element.131  The court analogized such a 
refusal to a trial judge giving a second-degree robbery instruction to the jury, 
but then telling the jury that it must find Jackson guilty of first-degree rob-
bery if it finds all of the elements of second-degree robbery have been met.132  
Therefore, the majority determined Section 556.046 must be interpreted in 
accordance with the defendant’s constitutional right to a trial by jury, and the 
majority stated that its holding is faithful to the language of Section 556.046 
when it is placed within this constitutional context.133 
Thus, the trial court is not permitted to refuse to grant a defendant’s re-
quest for a jury instruction for a nested lesser included offense, when the bur-
den to prove the differential element is on the State, because the jury’s right 
to disbelieve evidence is sufficient, by itself, to establish a basis in the evi-
dence to acquit the defendant of the charged offense. 
B.  The Dissent 
Judge Laura Denvir Stith, joined by Judge Breckenridge, concurred with 
the majority’s result, but dissented from the court’s holding that the jury’s 
right to disbelieve evidence is sufficient, on its own, to establish a basis in the 
evidence that would require a trial court to instruct a jury on a lesser included 
offense.134  The dissent agreed with the majority’s statement of the elements 
to be fulfilled under Section 556.046, but reasoned that the court’s conclusion 
“guts” Sections 556.046.2 and 556.046.3.135 
The dissent rejected the court’s claim that its holding reaffirmed the 
holdings of Pond and Williams.136  The dissent’s reading of Williams empha-
sized the statement in Williams that Section 556.046.2 only requires an in-
 
 129. Id. (quoting Shelby, 64 S.W.2d at 275). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 402. 
 134. Id. at 410 (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 135. Id. at 414. 
 136. Id. at 416. 
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struction for a lesser included offense when “a reasonable juror could draw 
inferences from the evidence” that the differential element of the greater of-
fense was not established.137  The dissent asserted that Williams required the 
application of the same reasonable juror standard as that utilized in Pond.138  
Based on these readings, the dissent concluded that the court’s holding elimi-
nated the reasonable juror standard from the analysis of Section 556.046, 
which the court had overruled in Williams, Pond, and numerous other cases 
establishing Missouri’s jurisprudence regarding jury instructions for lesser 
included offenses.139 
The dissent also attacked the court’s application of statutory construc-
tion to Section 556.046, arguing that the plain meaning of Sections 556.046.2 
and 556.046.3 is clear and unambiguous.140  The statute expressly requires a 
“basis in the evidence” to acquit the defendant of the greater charge before a 
trial court is required to instruct the jury as to a lesser included offense.141  
The dissent’s position was that the court’s holding makes this language mere 
surplusage, rendering it meaningless, which violates a basic principle that 
courts should avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that strips statutory 
language of its meaning.142 
The dissent also disagreed with the court’s conclusion that a trial judge 
may not apply a reasonable juror test in determining whether there was a ba-
sis in the evidence to support a jury instruction for a lesser included of-
fense.143  The dissent said the court’s “logic confuses questions of law with 
questions of fact.”144  The dissent’s position was that the jury’s right to find 
facts and the trial judge’s duty to declare the law are separate functions, and 
that the court was mistaken when it said the judge intrudes upon the jury’s 
province when she refuses to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense 
because she determined that no reasonable juror could find that there was a 
basis in the evidence to acquit the defendant as to the differential element.145  
It noted that the Supreme Court of the United States has expressly “disap-
proved of state laws that require a trial court to instruct down when there ‘is 
not a scintilla of evidence to support the lesser verdicts.’”146 
 
 137. Id. (quoting State v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)). 
 138. Id. at 417.  The holding in State v. Pond stated, “A reasonable jury could find 
the prior statements more believable than those at trial.”  131 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Mo. 
2004) (en banc). 
 139. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 417 (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 140. Id. at 415. 
 141. Id. at 414. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 411. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 412 (quoting Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 (1976) (plurality 
opinion)). 
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In order to reach its conclusion, the dissent relied on a decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Sparf v. United States.147  According to 
the dissent, Sparf held that a trial court has the authority to decide, as a matter 
of law, whether a jury should be instructed as to a lesser included offense.148  
Relying on Sparf, the dissent said that the jury’s power to disregard the law 
does not deprive the trial court of its authority to declare and instruct the jury 
regarding the law.149  The dissent stated the jury’s right to disbelieve evidence 
is a factor to be considered by the trial court in determining what reasonable 
conclusions and inferences the evidence supports.150  The fact that a jury may 
believe some evidence, but disbelieve other evidence, allows the court to 
instruct the jury as to a lesser included offense when there is a conflict in the 
evidence and the findings related to that conflict are the difference between 
an acquittal and a conviction as to the differential element.151  The trial judge 
has the duty to determine what instructions the evidence supports.152  There-
fore, a trial judge does not encroach upon the defendant’s right to a trial by 
jury by refusing to instruct on a lesser included offense.153 
V.  COMMENT 
The majority and the dissent disagree on every major point of law.  The 
only things on which they agree are the facts, the elements to be met under 
Section 556.046, and that Jackson should have been granted a jury instruction 
for the lesser included offense of second-degree robbery.  While they agree 
on the end result – that Jackson should have received the lesser included jury 
instruction – they disagree on how to reach that result.  This Part supports and 
augments the reasoning of the majority opinion, discusses the merits of the 
dissent while explaining its arguments’ shortcomings, and criticizes those 
aspects of the majority’s opinion that may have undesirable consequences. 
This Part focuses on the two most prominent points of contention.  First, 
it addresses the proper interpretation of the direct precedent, with a particular 
focus on Pond and Williams.  Did the court reaffirm those decisions, as it 
claimed, or did it effectively overrule them, as the dissent argues?  Second, 
this Part considers the proper interpretation of Section 556.046, which is de-
pendent upon an analysis of the defendant’s right to a trial by jury, and how 
that right is affected when a trial judge refuses to instruct the jury on a lesser 
included offense. 
 
 147. Id. at 411–13 (citing Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102–03, 105–07 
(1895)). 
 148. Id. at 412. 
 149. Id. at 411.  The power of the jury to which the dissent refers is the power of 
jury nullification, which the dissent characterizes as the power “to acquit arbitrarily.”  
Id. at 412. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 413. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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A.  The Direct Precedent: The Proper Interpretation of Pond and   
Williams 
Much of the debate in Jackson rests on what Santillan, Pond, and Wil-
liams meant when they rejected arguments made by the State in reliance on 
Olson.154  This Part will provide an analysis of the language of Pond and Wil-
liams, the two cases most at issue.  Following this analysis, it will be clear 
that Pond’s interpretation of what constitutes a basis in the evidence, for the 
purpose of granting a lesser included offense instruction, differs from that of 
Williams.  It will further show that the holding of Jackson is entirely con-
sistent with the holding of Williams because the decision in Williams demon-
strates that there is no need for some alternative evidence that the jury can 
believe in place of the evidence it disbelieves.  The jury’s disbelief of evi-
dence is sufficient, on its own, to establish a right to a lesser included offense 
instruction. 
The court found the State’s continued reliance on certain aspects of Ol-
son unjustified in light of Pond and Williams.155  It is clear that Pond was a 
narrow decision.156  It essentially followed the reasoning of Santillan, which 
held a jury instruction for the lesser included offense should have been given 
because, “[A] reasonable juror could draw inferences from the evidence pre-
sented that the defendant did not deliberate.”157  The only new factor in Pond 
was the State’s argument that the jury’s ability to disbelieve some part of the 
State’s evidence did not establish a basis to acquit the defendant of the greater 
offense.158  The Pond court rejected the State’s argument because the jury 
could disbelieve the State’s evidence and instead choose to believe the evi-
dence elicited during the cross-examination of the State’s witness.159  It is 
important to note that the court in Pond explicitly concluded that “[a] reason-
able jury could find the prior statements more believable than those at tri-
al.”160 
The court in Williams failed to articulate a belief that the jury could elect 
to believe one aspect of the evidence while disbelieving another, and the 
court’s holding does not indicate a conflict in the evidence.161  The defendant 
in Williams testified that he did not see Sweets use physical force to steal 
from the victim,162 while the victim testified that Sweets used physical 
 
 154. See generally id. 
 155. Id. at 398–99 (majority opinion). 
 156. See generally State v. Pond, 131 S.W.3d 792 (Mo. 2004) (en banc). 
 157. State v. Santillan, 948 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). 
 158. Pond, 131 S.W.3d at 794. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. State v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Mo. 2010) (en banc).  This is con-
trary to the circumstances in Pond, where there was an explicit conflict in the evi-
dence.  Pond, 131 S.W.3d at 794. 
 162. Williams, 313 S.W.3d at 657. 
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force.163  However, the defendant’s statement that he did not see Sweets use 
physical force is not the same as the defendant saying Sweets did not use 
physical force.  The defendant and victim’s versions of the events differed, 
but the differing statements did not directly conflict with each other like they 
did in Pond.  Therefore, unlike in Pond, the jury could only acquit the de-
fendant of the greater offense if it chose to disbelieve the victim’s account of 
the events.  As the Williams court put it, “The jurors could have believed 
Williams was complicit in the taking of money from [the victim], believed 
[the victim’s] testimony that no gun or knife was used, and disbelieved [the 
victim’s] testimony about the use of physical force.”164  Furthermore, the 
Williams court directly rejected the State’s argument that the defendant “was 
not entitled to the instruction on the sole basis that the jury might disbelieve 
some of the state’s evidence,”165 and its ability to disbelieve evidence or re-
fuse to draw necessary inferences “does not entitle the defendant to an in-
struction otherwise unsupported by the evidence.”166  Unlike in Pond, where 
the jury had alternative evidence it could choose to believe, the Williams jury 
only had the choice of disbelieving evidence.  This amounts to a tacit 
acknowledgement that the jury’s ability to disbelieve evidence is sufficient, 
by itself, to establish a basis in the evidence to acquit the defendant of the 
greater offense. 
The dissent accurately claims that Pond applied the reasonable juror 
standard, and that it required some evidence in the record to show the differ-
ential element was lacking.167  However, its claim to Williams is tenuous.  
The dissent rests its argument on the fact that Williams said, “If a reasonable 
juror could draw inferences from the evidence presented that an essential 
element of the greater offense has not been established, the trial court should 
instruct down.”168  However, this statement references a standard the Wil-
liams court simply did not apply in its holding.169  Additionally, the Williams 
court flatly rejected the State’s argument that there must be some affirmative 
evidence – not necessarily introduced by the defendant – in the record to sup-
port the instruction on the lesser included offense.170 
The Williams court claimed the State’s argument in Williams was reject-
ed previously in Pond.171  This was not the case.  Pond rejected the State’s 
 
 163. Id. at 660. 
 164. Id.  Unlike in Pond, the decision to disbelieve the victim’s claim of physical 
force stands on its own.  In Pond, the decision to disbelieve the victim’s claim of 
penetration was supported by the jury’s ability to instead believe the prior contradic-
tory statements made by the victim.  Pond, 131 S.W.3d at 794. 
 165. Williams, 313 S.W.3d at 661. 
 166. Id. at 660. 
 167. Pond, 131 S.W.3d at 794. 
 168. State v. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390, 411 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (Stith, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Williams, 313 S.W.3d at 660). 
 169. See generally Williams, 313 S.W.3d 656. 
 170. Id. at 661. 
 171. Id. 
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argument that the defendant was required to put on affirmative evidence, and 
Pond said the fact that a jury “might disbelieve some of the State’s evidence” 
did not entitle the defendant to an instruction.172  In Williams, the State’s ar-
gument asserted that some affirmative evidence must exist in the record, and 
it also argued that a defendant is “not entitled to the instruction on the sole 
basis that the jury might disbelieve some of the state’s evidence,”173 and the 
fact that it may disbelieve evidence or decline to draw necessary inferences 
“does not entitle the defendant to an instruction otherwise unsupported by the 
evidence.”174  The State’s argument in Williams is a far cry from the argu-
ments rejected in Pond.  Pond was a natural application of the holding of 
Santillan to a new set of facts.  Williams was a massive expansion of the logic 
in Pond, but the impact of this expansion was not obvious until now.  By 
rejecting the need for any affirmative evidence in the record to support a less-
er included instruction, Williams effectively held that a jury’s right to disbe-
lieve evidence was sufficient to establish a right to a lesser included offense 
instruction. 
The dissent’s arguments would properly be directed at the Williams 
court, whose holding essentially overruled the surviving language of Olson.  
Williams departed from precedent, rejecting Olson, Santillan, and Pond’s 
requirement that there be some evidentiary support for the instruction.175  
Instead, Williams required trial courts to instruct on a lesser included offense 
merely based on the jury’s ability to disbelieve the State’s evidence.176 
Therefore, the court’s holding in Jackson, while more elaborate and 
clearly articulated, essentially reaffirmed the holding of Williams.  Any ex-
pansion of the holding in Williams is a natural and logical expansion.  The 
Jackson court stated in clear terms what the Williams court implied: the jury’s 
right to disbelieve evidence and refuse to draw necessary inferences, standing 
alone, is sufficient to establish a basis in the evidence to acquit the defendant 
of the charged offense.177 
B.  The Defendant’s Right to a Trial by Jury 
Justice Scalia has noted, “The Constitution does not trust judges to make 
determinations of criminal guilt.”178  This statement attacked the view that a 
defendant’s conviction could stand because “judges could tell that [the de-
fendant] is unquestionably guilty.”179  In Jackson, the Supreme Court of Mis-
 
 172. Pond, 131 S.W.3d at 794. 
 173. Williams, 313 S.W.3d at 661. 
 174. Id. at 660. 
 175. Id. at 660–61. 
 176. Id. at 661. 
 177. State v. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390, 399, 400 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 178. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 32 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis omitted). 
 179. Id. at 31 (emphasis omitted). 
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souri shared Justice Scalia’s concern.  It attacked the notion that a judge may 
look at the evidence, know that a jury would be irrational to acquit the de-
fendant of the charged offense, and therefore refuse consideration of a lesser 
included offense.180  This concern was at the core of the court’s discussion of 
Section 556.046.181 
The dissent’s assertion that the court failed to interpret Section 556.046 
by its plain language is clearly correct.182  A “basis in the evidence”183 to 
acquit means a basis in the evidence upon which the decision to acquit may 
rest.  It does not, by its plain language, refer to the jury’s ability to disregard 
evidence.184  Therefore, the court must justify its application of statutory con-
struction to Section 556.046. 
The court’s position is that its interpretation of Section 556.046 is the 
only way to interpret the statute without risking the fundamental right to a 
jury trial and the presumption of innocence.185  At its core, this is a constitu-
tional argument.  The court’s position is that the dissent’s interpretation of the 
statute leads to a result that would contravene the Missouri Constitution.186 
The court should have made its reliance on the Missouri Constitution, 
rather than the U.S. Constitution, explicit.  The Jackson court is essentially 
interpreting Article I, Section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution, which guar-
antees that the right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate.187  The court only 
hints at its reliance on the Missouri Constitution in a block quotation from 
State v. Shelby;188 nevertheless, the fact that this decision is based on the Mis-
souri Constitution is the key to refuting the dissent’s argument.  Such an im-
portant factor in a court decision should not be tucked away in a block quote. 
Because the court’s statutory interpretation was influenced by its state 
constitutional concerns, the dissent’s reliance on federal constitutional law is 
misplaced.189  It is a well-established principle that states may grant greater 
protections under their own constitutions than those granted by the U.S. Con-
stitution.190  The fact that the Supreme Court of the United States disapproves 
of rules regarding lesser included instructions, such as the one adopted by the 
court in Jackson, is of little consequence.191  The Supreme Court of Missouri 
is not beholden to any other jurisdiction, including the federal government, 
 
 180. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 400. 
 181. See generally id. at 390. 
 182. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 415 (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 183. Id. at 396 (majority opinion). 
 184. Id. at 396–97. 
 185. Id. at 402. 
 186. See id. 
 187. MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a). 
 188. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 401. 
 189. See id. at 411–12 (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 190. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977). 
 191. See Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 412 (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
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when it interprets its own constitution to grant greater rights.  Additionally, 
Sparf’s refusal to recognize the right of a jury to make its own determina-
tions, even when those determinations ignore the law, may no longer be ap-
proved by the Supreme Court of the United States.  The Court noted, “[T]he 
very reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that 
they were unwilling to trust the federal government to mark out the role of 
the jury.”192 
The dissent correctly highlights the majority’s lack of precedential sup-
port for the proposition that a refusal to instruct the jury as to a lesser includ-
ed offense is tantamount to directing a verdict.  However, the strength of the 
court’s argument is its rationale, and sometimes a decision must be made 
without the benefit of direct precedent.193  The jury is the entity that deter-
mines guilt or innocence of a crime, not the judge.  For a judge to refuse to 
instruct the jury on a lesser offense that is included within the charged offense 
also denies the jury the opportunity to decide the defendant’s guilt on that 
offense.  It is true, the judge has not denied the jury the right to acquit the 
defendant of the charged offense, and she has thus not directed a verdict of 
guilt in a literal sense, but she has denied the jury the opportunity to find guilt 
on a lesser offense whose elements the jury determined were fully met.  In-
stead, the jury must find guilt on the greater offense, whose elements it might 
believe have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or acquit the de-
fendant entirely when it believes the defendant acted criminally.194  A jury 
may feel compelled to find guilt even though it believes a differential element 
has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  It feels this compulsion be-
cause it believes the defendant committed a wrong, and thus should be pun-
ished, but the judge has not instructed it on an appropriate lesser included 
offense.  In such a circumstance, the judge has essentially directed a verdict 
of guilt. 
Furthermore, contrary to the dissent, the jury does not decide what the 
law is when it elects to convict on a lesser included offense.195  Rather, it 
finds a fact unproven.196  A judge’s refusal to grant an instruction for a lesser 
included offense amounts to a finding of fact that the differential element has 
been met. 
The court’s rule here essentially mirrors the rules regarding verdicts.  A 
judge may direct an acquittal of the defendant when the evidence fails to meet 
the elements, but she may not direct a verdict of guilt, no matter how over-
whelming the evidence might be.197  With the court’s holding in place, a simi-
lar rule takes shape regarding jury instructions: a judge may refuse to instruct 
 
 192. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004). 
 193. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 411 (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 194. Id. at 403 (majority opinion). 
 195. Id. at 411 (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 196. See id. 
 197. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 84 (1983); see also FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 29. 
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the jury on the charged offense, and instead instruct it solely on a lesser in-
cluded offense,198 but she may not refuse to instruct the jury on a first-
level,199 nested, lesser included offense, no matter how overwhelming the 
evidence might be regarding the differential element. 
The jury acts as a check on the judiciary.200  If this is to hold true, it 
must be the jury’s role to decide what crime the defendant should be found 
guilty of, so long as the determination is made within the reasonable bounds 
of the law (i.e., the defendant is not convicted of a crime for which he has not 
been charged). 
C.  Future Consequences and Considerations 
The consequences of the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in Jack-
son remain to be seen.  When a defendant requests a jury instruction for a 
lesser included offense, for which the elements consist of a subset of the ele-
ments of the charged offense, the defendant is guaranteed the jury will be 
given the opportunity to consider the option of acquitting the defendant of the 
greater offense while convicting her of the lesser offense.201  Certainly, the 
court indicated that its intention was for such lesser included offense instruc-
tions to be granted every time they are requested.202 
The court’s decision in Jackson leaves one question unanswered.  It 
does not discuss how its ruling applies to lesser included offenses other than 
“first-level” lesser included offenses.203  The court’s limitation of this rule to 
first-level lesser included offenses seems arbitrary at best.  Why is a defend-
ant charged with first-degree robbery automatically entitled to an instruction 
on second-degree robbery, but not to an instruction for felony stealing?  The 
differential element between second-degree robbery and felony stealing is the 
use of force.204  Would a jury not be entitled to disbelieve the use of force 
while also disbelieving the use or threatened use of what appeared to be a 
 
 198. Doing so would be an extension of the notion that a judge may direct a ver-
dict of acquittal, which is permitted in federal courts by FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. 
 199. The majority opinion references this concept of a “first-level” lesser included 
offense.  See generally Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390.  It most likely refers to the first of a 
series of lesser included offenses.  Id. at 396 n.10.  For example, first-, second-, and 
third-degree assault are all part of a series of offenses.  See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 
565.050, .060, .070 (2000).  Second- and third-degree assault are both lesser included 
offenses of first-degree assault.  See id. §§ 565.060, .070.  Second-degree would be 
the “first-level” lesser included offense.  See id. § 565.060. 
 200. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) (“Just as suffrage ensures 
the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is 
meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”). 
 201. MO. REV. STAT. § 556.046 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 202. State v. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390, 402 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 203. Id. at 398. 
 204. Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 569.020 (2000), with MO. REV. STAT. § 571.015 
(2000). 
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weapon?  If the jury’s right to disbelieve evidence applies to the first-level 
lesser included offense, why does it not apply to the second- or third-level 
lesser included offenses?  The court’s failure to articulate its reasoning on this 
issue is disconcerting, and it may create uncertainty in how courts determine 
when they are required to instruct a jury on multiple lesser included offenses.  
Perhaps the line must be drawn somewhere.  But, if it is to be drawn at these 
first-level lesser included offenses, the trial courts must be provided with 
some rule to allow them to understand how second- or third-level lesser in-
cluded offenses must be treated. 
Additionally, certain statements made by the court in dicta are concern-
ing.  The court references the fact that a defendant may be entitled to post-
conviction relief when trial counsel fails to request a jury instruction for a 
lesser included offense, when that failure can be attributed to “inadvertence” 
as opposed to a reasonable trial strategy.205  Later in the opinion, the court 
says one consequence of its decision is that trial courts will likely give jury 
instructions for lesser included offenses, even when they are not requested, 
simply to avoid the possibility of post-conviction relief hearings.206  This 
dictum, though perhaps well-intentioned, is ill-conceived.  It is unlikely that 
the court intended to imply that a court could sua sponte instruct the jury as to 
a lesser included offense without the defendant’s assent, but it may have left 
open a path that leads precisely to that interpretation.  A defendant should 
always be permitted to take his or her chances and decline a jury instruction 
for a lesser included offense, even if doing so is irrational.  Any implication 
to the contrary endangers the right of the defendant to control his own trial 
strategy. 
A court should say what it means and mean what it says,207 because 
clarity on these issues, where ambiguity benefits no one, can solve problems 
before they ever arise. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Missouri will have to wait to see where the court’s decision in Jackson 
will take it.  There is already some indication that the lower courts are hostile 
toward the court’s decision.  The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern 
District refused to hold that a trial court erred in declining to give a lesser 
included jury instruction for third-degree assault, because differing mental 
states – knowingly committing the act for second-degree assault and acting 
recklessly for third-degree assault – do not constitute a differential element 
for the purposes of Jackson or Section 556.046.  Thus, proving second-degree 
 
 205. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 396 n.7 (quoting McNeal v. State, 412 S.W.3d 886, 
889–90 (Mo. 2013) (en banc)). 
 206. Id. at 402. 
 207. See DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG (1940) (demonstrating the im-
portance of clarity in words and meaning). 
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assault does not also prove third-degree assault.208  This is a holding without 
any basis in Jackson, and it is utterly refuted by statute.209  A similar case in 
the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District reached the opposite 
result. 210  The Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer in both cases, and 
it held that the defendants were each entitled to an instruction for the nested 
lesser included offense of third-degree assault. 211 
What might be the most interesting prospect of the Jackson decision is 
the possibility that it might have an impact outside of Missouri.  The vast 
majority of the country’s jurisdictions utilize rules resembling the rule advo-
cated for by Judge Stith’s dissent.212  It may be interesting to see how the 
court’s position is received by other states if the opportunity to rule on a simi-
lar issue were to arise. 
There will certainly be those who believe the Jackson decision is harm-
ful to the justice system.  Undoubtedly, there will be an increase in verdicts 
where juries compromise, finding a defendant guilty of a lesser offense be-
cause one or two jurors held out against the charged offense.  However, this 
is not necessarily harmful to the justice system.  Such compromises are more 
conducive to the purpose of the jury system.  No one should be convicted of a 
more serious crime because a lone, holdout juror did not believe the evidence 
proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and was browbeaten into finding the 
defendant guilty.  Now, those jurors have the opportunity to hold their ground 
and find a defendant guilty of a crime they believe the defendant was proven 
to have committed. 
It is also far less likely that a guilty defendant will go free when the prosecu-
tion over-charges the defendant because, assuming the defendant requested a 
lesser included jury instruction, the jury will now be able to take that into 
consideration.213  Indeed, a defendant guilty of a lesser included crime should 
not go free simply because the jury was not instructed on a lesser included 
offense.  While many of these scenarios would have likely resulted in a jury 
instruction for a lesser included offense under the old rule, Jackson takes 
away the trial court’s discretion and leaves it entirely to the jury to make its 
decision based on the evidence presented before it.
 
 208. State v. Randle, 2014 WL 4980347, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).  The court 
based its decision on the third element of Jackson’s interpretation of Section 556.046, 
which requires “a basis in the evidence for convicting the defendant of the lesser 
included offense for which the instruction is requested.”  Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 396. 
 209. See MO. REV. STAT. § 562.021.4 (2000); see Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390; see 
Randle, 2014 WL 4980347, at *17–18 (Mooney, J., dissenting). 
 210. See State v. Roberts, 2014 WL 6476715 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). 
 211. See State v. Randle, 465 S.W.3d 477 (Mo. 2015) (en banc); State v. Roberts, 
465 S.W.3d 899 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 212. See Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 418–21 (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
 213. It seems doubtful that many defendants will be willing to take the risk of 
being found guilty of a greater charge by declining to request a lesser included jury 
instruction, except when they are absolutely certain that they can obtain an acquittal. 
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